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ABSTRACT 
Due to recent vulnerabilities of Department of Defense (DoD) networks, along with the 
rising importance of cyberspace and cyberspace warfare endeavors among competing 
great powers, the DoD is quickly recognizing the importance of cyberspace.  At the same 
time, the roles of the military are shifting from traditional, strategic and conventional 
conflict into what Secretary of Defense Robert Gates calls “soft power”—the capacity to 
perform nation-building missions against transnational terrorism. 
Cyberspace operations can play an important role in soft power as developing 
countries grow in their connectivity to information, especially with the proliferation of 
cell phone networks.  By the end of 2010, 71 percent of new Internet users will be from 
developing nations.  Ninety percent of the entire globe already has mobile phone access.  
This thesis studies two promising utilizations of mobile phones: mobile money and 
mobile surveillance.  It is found that mobile money may reduce the threat of crime in 
non-stable areas where the United States is conducting nation-building operations.  It 
then discusses new technologies through mobile phones and mobile devices which may 
help to prevent the theft of WMD. 
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Due to recent vulnerabilities of Department of Defense (DoD) networks, along with the 
rising importance of cyberspace and cyberspace warfare endeavors among competing 
great powers, the DoD is quickly recognizing the importance of cyberspace.  At the same 
time, the roles of the military are shifting from traditional, strategic and conventional 
conflict into what Secretary of Defense Robert Gates calls “soft power”-- the capacity to 
perform nation-building missions as a hedge against transnational terrorism. 
Cyberspace operations can play an important role in soft power as developing 
countries grow in their connectivity to information, especially with the proliferation of 
cell phone networks.  By the end of 2010, 71 percent of new Internet users will be from 
developing nations.  Ninety percent of the entire globe already has mobile phone access.  
This thesis therefore studies two promising utilizations of mobile phones: mobile money 
and mobile surveillance.   
The effective use of mobile money through cyberspace may prove effective in 
nation-building missions by providing incentives against robbery specifically and crime 
in general.  Furthermore, mobile money and mobile surveillance may also have a positive 
impact against corruption rates, which would bring greater security in the context of 
transnational terrorists and their efforts to acquire WMD.  These technologies, as well as 
many other capabilities in cyberspace, may be very effective as hybrid capability that is 
so useful in soft power, and through which the DoD is now pursuing nation-building 
missions as well as counterterrorism.  This will become more important as devices 
continue to become more portable and accessible to the developing world. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The U.S. government and the Department of Defense (DoD) are quickly realizing 
the importance of cyberspace.  Due to recent vulnerabilities of DoD networks, along with 
the rising importance of cyberspace and cyberspace warfare endeavors among competing 
great powers, the DoD recognized cyberspace as another domain akin to Air, Land, Sea 
and Space.1  Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued an order on June 23, 2009, which 
gave birth to the new U.S. Cyber Command, charged with defending the military’s 
portion of cyberspace.2  Similarly, in May of 2010, the Air Force recoded most of its 
communications officers and enlisted airmen, making them Cyberspace Operations 
personnel and requiring more training and expertise in advanced network defense.  The 
Army, Navy and Marine Corps are undergoing similar restructuring.  The DoD is 
positioning itself to be effective in the use of military force to achieve cyberspace 
superiority as with the other domains. 
However, the roles of the military across all domains have also been changing 
since the end of the Cold War.  Today, after the defeat of Iraq’s Ba’athists and weakening 
of Afghanistan’s Taliban, the U.S. military has been placed in charge of stabilization 
operations and building well-functioning states.  These missions include forming new 
militaries and police, management to build infrastructure, and the facilitation of services 
such as hospitals, power plants, and schools.  Increasingly, the U.S. military finds itself 
departing from the traditional role of state-on-state warfare and thrust into the role of 
nation-builder and promoter of good governance.3 
 
                                                 
1 William Jackson, “DOD Establishes Cyber Command to Assume Defense of Military Cyberspace,”  
Government Computer News, June 24, 2009, at: http://gcn.com/Articles/2009/06/24/DOD-launches-cyber-
command.aspx (accessed October 21, 2010). 
2 Ibid. 
3 Note- “State building” is a more accurate term, since a nation of people does not necessarily conform 
to a country’s border.  However, in colloquial speaking the term “nation-building” is prevalent.  Therefore, 
this paper will use the more familiar term of nation-building. 
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While the military does this, it must also continue to provide security against 
insurgencies, often fueled by transnational terrorism, and under the constant threat of 
WMD.  For this reason, Secretary Gates has also begun to reposition DoD assets.  
Thomas Barnett notes: 
Given what war is now, in the age of transnational terrorism, Gates is 
firmly committed to beefing up the Defense Department's ‘soft power’ 
capabilities, meaning those pertaining to stability operations and nation-
building… Clinging to the new, hot-button concept of ‘hybrid war,’ Gates 
defends this historic institutional shift by noting that his new budget 
breaks down roughly as ‘10 percent for irregular warfare, about 50 percent 
for traditional, strategic, and conventional conflict, and about 40 percent 
dual-purpose capabilities.’4 
This thesis addresses the question of how cyberspace can be used for nation-building, 
especially with respect to the overarching objective of combating transnational terrorism. 
It was transnational terrorism, and more specifically the threat that transnational 
terrorists would procure WMD, that provided a key rationale for invading Afghanistan 
and Iraq; not regime change, but thwarting their capacity to acquire and use WMD after 
the attacks of 9/11.  Although never found in Iraq, it was widely believed by numerous 
government intelligence agencies that Iraq possessed WMD, or was at least actively 
trying to get them, and that WMD could fall into the hands of transnational terrorists who 
threaten the U.S. homeland and interests abroad.  Nation-building only came as a 
consequence to that invasion.  This was also a consideration for Afghanistan, which had 
harbored Osama Bin Laden and his associates who killed over 3,000 people on 
September 11, 2001.  Although Afghan insurgents have never been known to possess 
WMD, many fear their acquisition at the hands of Afghans after the 9/11 attacks.5  
Afghanistan has a poorly controlled border with Pakistan, which possesses nuclear 
weapons and weapons-grade nuclear fuel.  Therefore, the threat of WMD and their 
                                                 
4 Thomas Barnett, “Sleeper: The Awakening of Robert Gates,” Esquire, February 2010, at: 
http://thomaspmbarnett.squarespace.com/globlogization/2010/8/27/blast-from-my-past-sleeper-the-
awakening-of-robert-gates-201.html (accessed October 27, 2010). 
5 Robert Wesley, “Al-Qaeda’s WMD Strategy Prior to the U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan,” The 
Jamestown Foundation, October 7, 2005, at: 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=580&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid
%5D=180&no_cache=1 (accessed November 29, 2010). 
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proliferation within transnational terrorist networks is likely the highest priority of 
military operations, setting the context for nation-building today.  The risk of future 
stability and nation-building operations exists in other areas of the world as well given 
today’s extensive internationally organized-crime networks and the wider availability of 
WMD technologies and components as a result of an increase in nuclear-armed states and 
more reliance on nuclear power. 
Given the nature of the proliferation threat and the U.S. military’s changing role, 
it is critical the DoD consider the use of cyberspace to aid soft power missions in nation-
building.  Many believe this is not possible due to the technological aspects of cyberspace 
and the traditional requirement of a developed world’s infrastructure.  How can one build 
state capacity in cyberspace in failed or post-conflict states that usually have little in the 
way of computers and electricity, let alone fiber optic cables and data warehouses?   
Fortunately, this is an antiquated, 1990s vision of cyberspace.  As we enter into 
the second decade of the twenty-first century, cyberspace is now more personal and 
portable than just a few years ago.  The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 
a telecommunications division of the U.N., issued a report on October 19, 2010, stating 
that the developed world has been slowing down in Internet growth while the developing 
world’s use is rapidly growing at an accelerated rate.  Their report predicts that by the 
end of 2010, there will be 226 million new Internet users, 71 percent of whom will be 
from developing nations.6  Furthermore, the report states that 90 percent of the entire 
globe now has mobile phone access, again with most growth seen in the developing 
world.7  The report notes that “ITU’s new data indicate that among the estimated 5.3 
billion mobile subscriptions by the end of 2010, 3.8 billion will be in the developing 
world.”8  The line between mobile phone and Internet access is also shrinking as mobile 
phones with broadband are expanding rapidly as well within developing countries.  The 
number of countries with mobile phone broadband access has increased from 95 in 2007 
                                                 
6. Text from the International Telecommunication Union website, “ITU Estimates Two Billion People 
Online by End 2010,” October 19, 2010, at: http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press_releases/2010/39.aspx 




to 143 in 2010.9  Even faster, newer generation broadband is also on the horizon. 
cyberspace should therefore be recognized not as a domain exclusive to great powers and 
developed countries, but as a new and rapidly growing domain within the developing 
world, and therefore an effective means through which the DoD can help build state 
capacity in efforts that align with the goals of Secretary Gates.   
Cyberspace, when leveraged by governments to build institutions, may also be 
called e-governance.  The U.S. government defines e-governance as the use of “web-
based Internet applications or other information technology to enhance the access to and 
delivery of government information and services to the public, other agencies, and other 
government entities; or to bring about improvements in government operations that may 
include effectiveness, efficiency, service quality, or transformation.”10  The DoD can use 
these techniques within states where stability operations and nation-building operations 
exist, as well as export them to states vulnerable to transnational terrorism and the threat 
of WMD proliferation. 
Covering the breadth of cyberspace’s application to all soft power capacity within 
the context of DoD operations is too vast for a single thesis.  Therefore, this thesis will 
focus on the application of cyberspace, by either the DoD or other aspects of USG, for 
nation-building missions specific to providing security by combating crime and 
corruption, both of which create an environment where terrorists can flourish.  For crime, 
it will examine one cyberspace technology to combat crime: mobile money.  Then, this 
thesis will transition to the context of transnational terrorism and the biggest threat in its 
efforts to acquire WMD: corruption.  Finally, it will address another cyberspace 
technology to combat corruption: mobile surveillance.  These uses of cyberspace can 
produce the hybrid capability that Secretary Gates is looking for: a soft power capable of 
both nation-building as well as reducing the threat of transnational terrorism. 
                                                 
9. Telecommunication Union, “ITU Estimates Two Billion People Online by End 2010.”  
10. Text of “The E-Government Act of 2002,” annotated by Jeffrey Schildkraut, on the U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor and Statistics Web site at: 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20030220yb02p1.htm (accessed April 19, 2010). 
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A. IMPORTANCE 
There is a significant gap in research on e-governance and its potential to enhance 
national security. This dearth is primarily due to the very recent and rapid development 
and spread of cyberspace technology.  Its potential in the security arena is just now being 
considered. Research into the application of these technologies, many of which are 
relatively inexpensive, is critical in realizing new synergies for homeland security.  
Specifically, this research is important to U.S. security in a scenario where post-conflict 
states must be rebuilt quickly before any insurgency is to take hold, as well as against 
transnational terrorist organizations like al Qaeda that may use these weak or failing 
states to acquire WMD.  E-governance can help nation-building, and in turn reduce the 
threat of transnational terrorism. 
There exist global best practices that can enhance security, transparency and 
accountability, yet crime and corruption are still rampant in many countries, indicating 
that there is either too little will, knowledge, or resources to counter them effectively.  E-
governance can very likely help implement best practices and help fill the void. One 
cyberspace application of e-governance can be through mobile money, which is the use 
of e-money through mobile phones.  Mobile money shows promise in delivering much 
greater security for citizens to store and transfer their money, both to the government and 
each other in exchange for goods and services-- critical in weaker, less stable states with 
rampant crime.  E-money—which is any digital money to include credit cards, bank 
transactions, online banking, and the like—can circumvent theft because it eliminates the 
need for physical currency, the preferred method of transactions by criminals, 
transnational terrorists, and organized crime members.  Middlemen may be 
circumvented, and payments can be issued directly from a legitimate state institution, 
such as a reputable bank, to the individual, such as nuclear laboratory scientists, weapons 
guards, or customs and port officials.  E-money may be particularly applicable to 
countries with nuclear arsenals and high corruption indexes such as Russia, Pakistan, 
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India, and China.11  Of equal benefit, e-money can also enhance accountability.  E-
money, when implemented with audit trails that require government-certified institutions 
and non-anonymous transactions, is an effective form of e-governance which makes theft 
and corruption more difficult. 
Another best practice is the proliferation of open-source surveillance.  With cell 
phones increasing in both number and capability in the developing world, citizens are 
now capturing crime and corruption on videos, then uploading them to the Internet, 
forcing national and international action.  One such case took place in Malaysia, where 
citizens armed with cell phone cameras have begun capturing police engaging in corrupt 
practices, then posting these pictures and videos on the Internet.12  These practices 
enhance both transparency, in that the general public and government officials can see 
what takes place, as well as accountability, either through voting or domestic and 
international opinion and pressure.  This factor is not limited to citizens or cell phone use, 
however.  Governments can also install surveillance in government institutions and 
display it through the Internet, even when guarding sensitive items like WMD.  Officials 
would then be less likely to take a bribe or look the other way if they thought they were 
being recorded anywhere by anyone, including both their governments as well as 
ordinary citizens. 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Perhaps the most important problem raised by cyberspace governance is in its 
unrealized potential.  Little has been written about it, especially as technology continues 
to rapidly evolve.  For example, the iPhone can now stream real-time video, monitor 
security cameras, act as a remote control, and provide GPS navigation with satellite 
                                                 
11 Text from Transparency International Website, “Survey Indices 2009,” at: 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table (accessed 
September 28, 2010). 
12. Text from Global Voices “Cellphone Video Captures Police Excess,” at: 
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2006/09/07/malaysia-cellphone-video-captures-police-excess/  (accessed June 
16, 2010). 
 7
maps, all from a single hand-held device that fits inside a pocket.13  Other technologies 
like smart cards can transfer money without even the need of a computer network at all.  
These exciting, small, inexpensive, and widespread technologies possess great potential 
for e-governance at home and abroad, but their application by the DoD is nascent.  These 
technologies started as commercial, privately used products in the developed world, yet 
have untapped potential for security applications by states, both rich and poor.  Troops, 
not policymakers, have often been at the forefront of applying these commercial 
technologies to security challenges they have faced in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Application 
of cyberspace technologies need not be this ad-hoc and limited to innovating units, but 
instead needs concerted thought, evaluation, and distribution of new ideas in partnerships 
between the DoD, NGOs and private corporations.  Its application may be difficult to 
achieve if policymakers from an older, less technologically savvy generation cannot 
envision or embrace its potential. 
A related challenge is the dearth of concrete studies and recent data specific to e-
money, crime and corruption.  For example, Kenya is one country that has in the past few 
years aggressively pursued the use of e-money in some regions but not others through the 
innovative use of cell phones.  Kenya also possesses detailed statistics on national and 
provincial crime.  This data can be accessed and examined in a natural experiment to see 
if a pattern exists between the crime statistics within areas with access to e-money 
contrasted with crime statistics within areas void of access to e-money.  To date, such 
studies have yet to be conducted.  While great strides have been made in recent decades 
to assess crime and corruption levels, considerably more work needs to be done to 
measure and understand this problem.  
Given the evolving framework of technology in wireless handheld devices, 
combined with their shrinking cost, solutions now require far less money and physical 
infrastructure than they once did. Technological solutions to security problems have 
traditionally required significant infrastructure and monetary resources to support them, 
                                                 
13. Dan Frommer, “25 Things You Can Remote Control with Your IPhone,” Business Insider, March 
16, 2010, at: http://www.businessinsider.com/25-things-you-can-remote-control-with-your-iphone-2010-3 
(accessed May 9, 2010). 
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such as large environmentally controlled rooms of computers, network cables, and 
stringing of phone lines, and UAVs that try to but cannot be everywhere at once. E-
governance is increasing in relevance within the developing world more than many are 
aware.  The fact that software has also continued to evolve at a rapid pace makes e-
governance just as applicable to the developed world, especially as it can improve 
existing banking and security integration among state-controlled WMD sites through 
rapid and relatively simple adaptation and redeployment. Policymakers will need to make 
the political decision to shift resources from heavily infrastructure-reliant manufacturers 
and governments that measure development by how large and visible their project 
footprint is, to industry newcomers that are considerably more mobile, quickly adaptable, 
and less flashy. Indeed, adoption of smart cards does not provide ribbon-cutting 
opportunities as do UAVs or new government buildings.   
This thesis will consider the political and technological issues presented here, 
especially as they apply to good governance and building of state capacity.  Despite 
challenges, it is hypothesized that e-governance through cyberspace could and should be 
applied by the DoD to promote good governance in weak states.  This soft power 
approach to combating crime and corruption, two key indicators of state weakness, can 
help reduce the risk of transnational terrorism due to relatively low cost, ease of use, 
widespread availability, adaptability, and ultimate ability to counter crime and corruption, 
both of which are sufficient conditions for transnational terrorism in weak states. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY 
1. Crime and Transnational Terrorism 
When discussing nation-building operations, the concept of myopic behavior is 
important, because it can describe a wide spectrum of citizens in a weak or failing state 
and how they view the world.  To be myopic, a state’s citizenry can be described as short 
sighted in a figurative sense, meaning they take actions which favor the present or 
immediate gain much more than the future, such as holding fast to principles for a greater 
gain over time.  This concept is significant because it is influenced by security and 
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influences crime and corruption through what is known as the “wheel of violence.”  It is 
therefore applicable to many nation-building operations, and especially post-conflict 
states where terrorism can thrive.   
The “wheel of violence” describes how illegitimate physical harm, or a lack of 
security, increases uncertainty, which increases myopic behavior.14  Myopic behavior in 
turn increases crime and corruption as citizens look for more immediate gain, regardless 
of principles, in the wake of more uncertainty about the future.  This causes societal risk 
to increase, which also leads to economic decline.15  This economic decline tends to 
instigate more crime and violence, thus continuing the cycle.16  Conflict leads to 
decreased savings, increased depreciation, and therefore increased risk.  New investment 
is not quickly integrated due to the myopic behavior of the population. 
 
Figure 1.   Illustration of The Wheel of Violence 
                                                 
14. Text from Dr. Robert McNab, “Introduction to Economics of Insurgencies” PowerPoint lecture, 




This relationship may be hard to understand conceptually; however, there is a 
good model which describes it.  The Solow model accounts for the diminishing return of 
capital in relationship to violence.  The first principle of the Solow model is that the 
capital-to-labor and capital-to-output ratios are not fixed.  This means that, at some point 
along the capital to output function, the infusion of capital increases at a decreasing rate, 
thus requiring more capital infusion for less increase in output. 
 
Figure 2.   y = Output per Worker and k = Capital per Worker17 
When violence increases, the labor force declines as those with the means to do so flee 
the country.  This flight of labor, or human capital vested in experienced workers, is slow 
to recover.  As new investment flows in, it cannot be absorbed as well as it once was due 
to the increased depreciation of infrastructure and support, as well as the decreased labor 
and human capital. 
                                                 
17. McNab, “Introduction to Economics of Insurgencies.”  
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Figure 3.   (n + d)k Is the Change in Capital per Worker Due to Population and 
Depreciation Influenced by Violence18 
To understand the Solow model, consider the investment of a hospital in an area 
plagued with post-conflict violence or extreme crime.  Foreign or government aid can 
build a modern hospital, but who will operate and maintain it?  Local doctors, 
administrators and entrepreneurs were likely the first to flee the area when conflict arose, 
or may not be there due to high crime.  This has a negative effect on population and 
depreciation relative to capital per worker.  If equipment breaks, many technicians and 
industrial equipment are in short supply.  It takes years, even decades, to rebuild the 
inherent human capital within these states to maintain these ventures with self-
sufficiency.  Even worse, if there is a fear of future conflict or lack of security, myopic 
behavior will persist, thus limiting future investment absorption capacity even further. 
Under this illustrative example with the Solow growth model, there may be four 
doctors in a local area.  If you invest enough to build a hospital that can employ ten 
doctors, you will have to increase investment substantially to pay the transaction cost of 
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getting six more doctors to relocate to the local area.  This cost is much greater than the 
cost of employing the first four doctors who still live in the area and are looking for work.  
This difference is important because it is a fundamental, driving principle in nation-
building.  It is often tempting to think one can simply invest significant capital in a post-
conflict or weak state and expect a linear increase in output.  With the Solow model, 
however, one can understand the most efficient investment of capital, especially as it 
relates to security and myopic behavior of the country.  Output is not linear, but 
constrained to local support.  This local support is key in a weak state which may lack the 
governmental capacity through institutions to facilitate security or investment. 
“Hard Lessons,” published by the Special Inspector General of Iraq 
Reconstruction Stuart Bowen, Jr., is a well-respected report which summarizes the 
findings of hundreds of interviews and investigations regarding the United States’ 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq.19  It is also perhaps the best analysis of the impact of crime 
in a weak state without local capacity to support security or investment.  The Iraq of 2003 
to 2004 was the quintessential weak state, with high crime, high corruption, insecurity, 
and the lack of infrastructure and services.  This condition fostered transnational 
terrorism within the context of U.S. nation-building operations.  Bowen provides a 
window into the security assumptions regarding reconstruction that coalition planners 
made going into Iraq, how they applied their instruments of power to achieve those 
effects, the philosophy they pursued while applying that power, and the results of their 
efforts with regard to crime, and eventual terrorism in Iraq.  Ultimately, Bowen 
demonstrates that efforts against crime and terrorism were largely ineffective due to the 
lack of a single point of interagency reconstruction management, thereby preventing 
cohesive implementation of a strategic security and economic plan.  Use of cyberspace is 
mostly non-existent.   
Perhaps the most fundamental assumptions the coalition made regarding 
economic reconstruction, as well as reconstruction in general, was that it would last as 
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short as two years, it would virtually pay for itself through oil revenue, and crime would 
not be a serious issue, because Iraqis would welcome harbingers of democracy. 20, 21, 22  
These assumptions now seem very unrealistic, especially in light of the Departments of 
State and Defense “Parade of Horribles” memo published at the time.  This memo, which 
countered such assumptions, went mostly ignored.23  Until the launch of the war, and 
even through its conclusion through May of 2003, the coalition’s naïve optimism 
remained.  It did not plan to need any significant security force to guard economic 
reconstruction efforts, such as oil pipelines or financial institutions.  Quite the contrary, 
CENTCOM planned to reduce troops to 30,000 by August of 2003.24   
Finally, while each agency had its own plan for post-war Iraq, there was no 
overarching, coordinated strategic plan that took into account important elements like 
sequencing of change and the interplay between sectors and initiatives.  Overall 
operational control was given to the new Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Agency (ORHA) within the DoD, but constant power struggles and alienation of the State 
Department rendered ORHA mostly ineffective.25  The U.S. Treasury Department was 
put in charge of the overall financial recovery and development of Iraq’s economy, 
USAID planned for economic stability as it related to humanitarian relief and some 
infrastructure repair, and the DoD planned to operate the massive oil industry which, it 
was believed, would be the “silver bullet” to spur economic growth for Iraq from 
providing fuel to power plants and revenue for infrastructure and investment.26 27  
Throughout the economic planning, little involvement from Iraqi citizens was mentioned. 
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With these fundamental assumptions and disjointed planning in place, the 
coalition set forth to shore up its economic plan.  First, Treasury’s plan for Iraq’s 
economic recovery rested on transforming it from a statist economy to a stable and open 
market economy using two fundamental pillars: stabilizing Iraq’s currency and restoring 
operations among Iraq’s financial institutions, to include the central and commercial 
banks.28 29  The Treasury Department planned to fund these efforts by seizing Iraqi assets 
to continue payment of government employees as well as securing financial 
institutions.30  Meanwhile, USAID continued to link economic stability with 
humanitarian efforts and, therefore, planned for employment and micro-lending programs 
to jump-start the Iraqi economy post-conflict.31  The DoD plan for the oil industry joined 
the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) with Halliburton’s KBR to stop any oil fires lit 
by a falling Iraqi army, upgrade dilapidated equipment, and ultimately help run the 
industry.   
For the most part, the Treasury Department’s plan was a success story.32  On 
March 20, 2003, President George W. Bush authorized the freezing of Iraqi funds totaling 
$1.9 billion, which the treasury used to pay Iraqi salaries until it set up a more permanent 
solution.33  Two months later, UN Resolution 1483 created the Development Fund for 
Iraq (DFI), which utilized 95 percent of Iraq’s oil revenue to fund both reconstruction 
efforts as well as administration payments. 34  Incidentally, both of these events led to the 
largest airborne transfer of physical currency in history, with regular airborne shipments 
between New York and Baghdad starting at $20 million and ending at $4 billion.35  
Afterward, the treasury department moved swiftly and effectively to secure debt relief for 
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Iraq from the international community, ultimately resulting in cutting Iraq’s international 
debt of $130 billion by up to 80 percent and preventing the economy from collapsing.36  
Finally, Iraqi bank notes were successfully exchanged for post-Saddam currency.  
Although there were terrorist attacks, none stopped the conversion, and the currency 
exchange program was a success that resulted in the new dinar appreciating against the 
U.S. dollar.37 
However, the overall application of power was a failure due to rampant crime and 
insecurity, which helped fuel sectarian violence and an insurgency.  At the most critical 
time of reconstruction, leadership was in transition as well as in a vacuum.  ORHA was 
ousted from the CPA just a month after the invasion, and the CPA was closed just a year 
later.38 39 In perhaps the most critical window of opportunity in post-war Iraq, Paul 
Bremer made many decisions and prioritized projects as head of the CPA without the 
input of other agencies with expertise like USAID and the Department of State, to 
include disbanding of the Iraqi military, resulting in a massive security burden and 
hundreds of thousands of unemployed, armed men who began looting and committing 
widespread crime.40   
It is interesting to note that the DoD’s largest concern was an insurgency, but in 
fact the first major security issues were crime, not insurgency.  After taking over the 
country, the DoD planned for insurgent attacks on oil supply with the potential for oil 
fires to be lit by Iraqi insurgents.  They were greatly surprised when only nine oil fires 
were recorded.41  Instead of insurgent attacks on oil pipelines, major banks were looted 
and safety deposit boxes stolen.  Of Iraq’s largest banking chain, only two of the 170 
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banks remained open.42  Post-war looting among the oil sector continued for ten weeks, 
causing almost a billion dollars in damage.43  High crime rates continued for years, with 
as recently as 2006 Iraqis listing crime as their top concern, even beyond the insurgency 
and terrorism that had begun to take hold in the country.44  In this regard the “Surge” and 
eventual capacity building of Iraqi military and security forces helped reverse this trend, 
but only after years of squandered opportunities. 
To add insult to injury, the CPA had difficulty deciding to fund and support Iraq’s 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which were the “sole providers of essential public 
utilities and the leading providers of a large number of public goods and services as well 
as of consumer and industrial products.”45  The CPA was concerned that more money 
was owed than actually at hand and the debt between enterprises was unverifiable.  
Therefore, the CPA made the controversial decision against the recommendation of many 
in the Treasury Department to freeze SOE funds while also cancelling SOE debts.  By 
August only one-third of the SOEs were operational.46  Once again, Iraqis were not 
included in the process.   
The coalition began to realize the oil industry could not fund Iraq nation-building.  
Reconstruction cost estimates for 2004 were $35 billion, while oil revenues were less 
than $13 billion.  Therefore, the CPA began lobbying congress for significant additional 
funding.47  However, once again this process was isolated, and USAID was shut out.  
USAID was critical, since CPA plans focused heavily on “building things” and not 
institutions.48  One could build infrastructure projects, but who would operate and 
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maintain them once built?  The view of Iraqi citizens had grown more myopic as the 
wheel of violence, through crime and sectarian attacks, swept the country and fed on 
itself. 
The CPA also requested more funds from international donations.  Under the 
UN’s International Reconstruction Fund Facility (IRFF), the United States funded an 
additional $18.7 billion, while outside countries pledged an additional $13.5 billion.  
However, this was not as extensive or supportive as hoped due to worsening security and 
a lack of support among leading nations like Germany, France and Russia.49  The CPA 
stood up an office called the Program Management Office (PMO) to manage U.S. 
contributions to the IRFF, but due to interagency rivalry (between the CPA, USACE, and 
USAID) and a cumbersome contracting process, only two percent of the funds were spent 
on reconstruction by the time the CPA was closed in 2004.50  This problem continued, 
albeit under different circumstances, through the transition of the Iraqi government to the 
end of 2006, with Iraqi ministries spending just 17 percent of their capital budgets.  
However, the coalition leveraged imbedded civilians, many of Iraqi origin, to help the 
bureaucracy make major spending decisions.  By 2007 this statistic had jumped to 51 
percent, although it was not spent uniformly across Iraq’s provinces.51  
In conclusion, the coalition entered Iraq without the necessary security or 
measures to prevent crime or corruption, which reduced institutional capacity to 
effectively invest capital in nation-building.  As the Solow model describes, this jump in 
crime, violence and corruption significantly lowered the amount of capital which could 
be effectively invested in Iraq’s reconstruction, squandering the most critical window of 
opportunity right after invasion and through the first years of occupation.  Iraq still faces 
regular terrorist attacks and high crime rates.  Fortunately, the United States can learn 
from these mistakes for future operations, working to reduce or prevent crime and 
corruption in nation-building operations.  Cyberspace can help in this effort.  
                                                 
49. Bowen, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 103. 
50. Ibid., 114. 
51. Ibid., 268. 
 18
2. Corruption and Transnational Terrorism 
In failing states, as economic growth declines and people grow more myopic, they 
look to gain what they can in the present, which increases corruption.  This increased 
corruption furthers the cycle of violence on many fronts.  It increases the risk to 
investment since a portion of the investment will not be going to where it was intended.  
It also increases the transaction costs of doing business by driving up prices to account 
for depreciation through crime as well as corruption through skimming, leading to a 
decline in foreign investments and state revenues.  This weak economy in a weak state 
fosters terrorism. 
Although it often gets little attention in the media, it is difficult to overstate the 
important link between corruption and state weakness.  Perhaps the best statement comes 
from the World Bank in 2004, which reported: “The Bank has identified corruption as the 
single greatest obstacle to economic and social development.  It undermines development 
by distorting the rule of law and weakening the institutional foundation on which 
economic growth depends.”52  This came on the heels of a decade of work by 
Transparency International (TI), a global coalition dedicated to fighting corruption which 
has worked closely with the World Bank and intergovernmental agencies since 1993.53  
TI defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for personal gain.”54   
 When the word “corruption” is mentioned, it is often used synonymously with 
bribery.  The U.S. Department of State groups corruption and bribery together.55  When 
corruption is equated to bribery, many may think of low-ranking officials passing bribes 
under the table, while others perhaps think of high-ranking politicians who use their 
power to get perks and handouts from lobbyists or other government agencies.   
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 In actuality, the idea of corruption can be far more sinister and have much more 
dire consequences to national security than the above examples, which is why the World 
Bank placed such a heavy emphasis on the problem of corruption in 2004.  USAID 
agreed, stating a year later in its 2005 Anticorruption Strategy report that “an 
international consensus has now emerged that corruption and poor governance fuel state 
failure, deter foreign investment, and cripple economic growth and development.”56  
Therefore, it is safe to say that corruption can go beyond mere bribery or nepotism, with 
consequences that predispose the entire state toward failure, thereby increasing the risk of 
terrorism within that state, and make any nation-building effort far more difficult. 
 However, in today’s globalized environment, with the Internet and 
interconnectedness like never before, even state-failure can be an understatement.  
Corruption can have further implications beyond its own national borders, to include 
threatening the United States through transnational terrorism.  It can also affect far more 
than only the economy and development.  To make this conclusion, one need only to 
consider the most significant threat to U.S. National Security-- the use of WMD against 
the state-- where corruption would likely play a significant role.   
 What if even a handful of the guardians of nuclear knowledge or material in a 
weak state are corrupt, leading to a terrorist organization’s acquisition of WMD?  In such 
a scenario, the threat of WMD against the United States would not be found in the 
nations who possess them, but rather in those nations losing control of WMD to terrorists 
bent on a radical agenda of attacking the United States and its interests and allies.  This 
caries even more threat, since terrorists may not concern themselves with a non-
conventional U.S. counter-attack.  Who would the U.S. retaliate against, if the state itself 
did not authorize any use of WMD against the U.S.?  Unfortunately, this is not a fictional 
idea, but a very real and present danger in the twenty-first century.  There are two solid 
examples of how corruption has increased the risk of nuclear weapons being employed 
against the U.S. in weak or failing states.  In South Africa, weapons-grade nuclear 
material was 
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almost stolen.  In Pakistan, weapons-grade nuclear material, knowledge and equipment 





II. CYBERSPACE AS SOFT POWER TOOL AGAINST CRIME:   
E-MONEY 
The importance of reducing crime in weak states and its potential to contribute to 
transnational terrorism was seen in Iraq.  Therefore, how might cyberspace be utilized to 
combat crime and spur investment in weak states where similar conditions exist, such as 
high crime and corruption, and therefore reduce the threat of developing transnational 
terrorism?  One application which shows promise is electronic money, or e-money.  Once 
money exists electronically, it can circumvent criminals who tend to use physical cash 
due to its portability and inherent lack of accountability.   
E-money now exists in mobile phone networks.  This is critical, since as already 
noted in the introduction, 90 percent of the entire world has access to cell phones today, 
and coverage is accelerating in the developing world.  When discussing e-money specific 
to mobile phones, it is often called “mobile money.”  Mobile money is expanding rapidly 
in developing nations like Kenya, with promise for the future in other developing 
countries.57   
E-money brings another benefit, in that it can be implemented in areas that do not 
have vast infrastructures because modern technologies do not require power lines or 
phone lines.  Today, electronic currency can travel directly through cell phones, with a 
tower to service thousands of phones with data services to the Internet, bringing voice 
and data capabilities to extremely rural areas.  This was the case most recently in Haiti, 
where mobile generators were used by Haitians to charge cell phones and maintain cell 
phone towers, even when Port Au Prince was without power and mostly in ruins due to 
the massive Earthquake in 2010.58   
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For effective evaluation of e-money’s effect on crime, however, quantitative data 
needs to be obtained and analyzed.  Perhaps the best case study for e-money in a weak 
state with active transnational terrorism organizations may be found in Kenya.  Kenya 
has already proven its vulnerability to transnational terrorists with its links to Al Qaeda 
and the bombing of the U.S. embassy in its capitol city of Nairobi in 2002.59  
Furthermore, Kenya is ranked low in the Human Development Index (HDI) as a weak 
state with limited infrastructure and high crime.  Kenya has also been aggressively 
pursuing mobile money since 2007.  However, this mobile money only exists in specific 
areas covered by mobile phones.  Kenya can therefore be examined in a natural 
experiment to see if there is a difference between the trends in crime where mobile 
phones, and therefore mobile money, exist, as compared to trends in crime where there 
are no mobile phones or mobile money.   
A. MOBILE MONEY’S EXPANSION IN KENYA 
Mobile money in Kenya was launched in March of 2007 through its largest cell 
phone carrier, Safaricom.60  It was touted as a “24 hour teller through your cell phone” 
and called M-Pesa after the Swahili word “Pesa” for cash.61  M-Pesa, to a Kenyan, 
literally means “mobile money.”  It is extraordinarily simple, requiring no bank account 
and only the cheapest of cell phones (no smart phone required).62  Most Kenyans can 
take physical currency and turn it into a Safaricom representative, who collects the cash 
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phone account.  The receiver can then use this credit to either pay his or her own phone 
bill or turn it in to another Safaricom representative for physical currency again.  It is also 
secure, using a PIN as do ATMs.64 
It was effective in being adopted by a vast amount of Kenya’s population of over 
40 million people.65  Within the first month, Safaricom registered over 20,000 users, far 
ahead of expectations.66  By June 2008, there were 2.3 million registered M-Pesa 
customers.67  By July of 2009, the number of customers had grown to over 7 million.68  
By November 2009, the total had reached over 9 million customers, and by October 2010 
there were 12.5 million M-Pesa customers.69, 70 
 
Figure 4.   M-Pesa Customer Growth Over Time, 2007–2010 
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Using the most recent estimated Kenyan population growth rate of 2.6 percent per 
year, it is interesting to see how the number of M-Pesa customers is growing within the 
context of the total population of Kenya.71  This estimation is subject to some error, since 
an unknown portion of M-Pesa customers may own multiple M-Pesa accounts.  However, 
it is thought that this number is minimal, since having multiple accounts incurs a cost of 
multiple phone numbers with little benefit to the consumer.  Therefore, assuming a single 
customer to single Kenyan relationship, one can see how M-Pesa is establishing itself as 
a common practice within Kenya. 
Date Pop M‐PESA M‐Pesa / Cap
Mar‐05 35.9 0 0.0%
Mar‐06 36.8 0 0.0%
Mar‐07 37.8 0.02 0.1%
Jun‐08 38.7 2.3 5.9%
Jul‐09 39.7 7 17.6%
Nov‐09 40.7 9 22.1%
Oct‐10 41.8 12.5 29.9%
Kenya M‐PESA Statistics (in Millions)
 
Table 1.   Kenya M-Pesa Customers per Population raw data 
 
Figure 5.   Percent of Kenyan Population Using M-Pesa 
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As we can see in the figures above, using the 12.5 million customer total in 
October 2010, there is now almost one M-Pesa customer for every three Kenyans, 
assuming an estimated Kenya population of 41.8 million for 2010 (using Kenya’s 2008 
population data combined with Kenya’s 2.6 percent annual population growth rate).72  
This is consistent with other sources, with research from MIT indicating 38 percent of 
Kenyan households have at least one person who uses mobile money.73   
It should be noted that M-Pesa was not a random rollout.  It was a well-
engineered, concise business plan by Vodacom, sponsored by the U.K.’s Department for 
International Development (DFID), and therefore, in effect, a use of British soft power to 
boost state capacity in Kenya.74 75  It was a highly effective partnership between public 
and private enterprise which produced these results.76 Today, M-Pesa is now growing to 
spawn similar projects sponsored by other partnerships between private enterprise, 
NGOs, and public institutions.  Safaricom’s parent company, Vodacom, has launched the 
service in Tanzania and Afghanistan, with plans for South Africa in the works.77  The 
Bill and Melinda Gates foundation and USAID plan to use similar concepts to implement 
mobile money in Haiti.78 
Also, M-Pesa is not the only mobile money solution in Kenya.  Although when it 
was launched it was the only service of its kind, competing cell phone companies are now 
launching their own mobile money services.  Zain, the second largest cell phone 
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company in Kenya next to Safaricom, started “Zap” mobile money service in February 
2009.79  By October 2010, Zap had reached 2 million customers in Kenya.80   
This has potential for stability operations and nation-building in weak states, since 
aid groups and institutions can provide financial assistance more directly to individuals 
without the need for government bureaucracy.  However, this is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  What we must now examine is if such circumvention of physical currency is 
effective for security from a DoD perspective.  In the context of Iraq, would mobile 
money be effective against such crimes as theft and robbery?  In theory, it should be, 
since the only transaction that takes place is between institutions or individuals with a 
mobile phone and a secure PIN. 
B. MOBILE MONEY VERSUS CRIME 
The overall state of economic and criminal statistics in Kenya is somewhat poor.  
M-Pesa is too new and has outpaced data collection, some of which is only current as of 
2008 when M-Pesa was still relatively new. However, there is data that is reliable and 
available enough to conduct some analysis.  
The Human Development Report is highly regarded as an accurate gauge of the 
state of a country’s development.  This report, published by the United Nations, rates 
countries on items like per capita income, education, and crime on the HDI.  In the latest 
2010 HDI published November 4, 2010, the United States was ranked fourth of 169 
countries studied.81  Kenya, however, was ranked 128th, placing it in the bottom quarter 
of developed nations under the category of “low human development” along with 
countries like Afghanistan and Sudan.82  Kenya is therefore a good case to study when 
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considering the type of country the United States may experience when conducting 
nation-building operations and countering terrorism in such weak states. 
To explore the relationship between M-Pesa and crime, Kenyan National Police 
crime statistics must be used.  The Kenyan National Police have made public their crime 
statistics from 2006 until 2008.  Working with the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, this 
researcher has also obtained crime statistics from 1995 until 2005, as well as 2009.  
Fortunately, these statistics break out total national crimes according to categories, to 
include economic crimes, as well as provincial crimes.   
Unfortunately, the rest of Kenya’s crime statistics are of poor quality.  Kenyan 
police total national crimes per month, but specific crimes like robbery and theft are only 
totaled annually.  Provincial data is also limited to aggregate crimes reported per year, 
with no separation between types of crime.  Crimes are not specified at the provincial 
level, which would be most useful to contrast between areas of mobile phone coverage.  
There are also errors in summation of crimes as well as differences in some data reported.  
For example, the Kenyan police post crime statistics on their website that states there 
were 1,261 murders in 2007.83  However, they also published a report by the 
commissioner of police which states there were only 1,154 murders in 2007.84  
Fortunately, there are four different reports which have equal totals for all crimes.  The 
Kenyan commissioner report therefore appears to be the only anomaly.  This thesis will 
therefore use the data from the other reports as posted on the Kenyan Police website. 
Further research is needed to examine all Kenyan criminal statistics per region, 
per month, through the end of 2010 and beyond, especially given the rapid growth of 
mobile-money use within the population of Kenya since last year.  Due to this lack of 
data as well as problems mentioned above, any attempt to examine Kenyan crime data 
will be subject to some error.  However, trends may still be found when looking at the 
data as available. 
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1. Nationwide Total Crime 
Kenya’s total crime has seemed relatively unchanged since the introduction of M-
Pesa in 2007.  It dropped significantly in 2007, held this level in 2008, but returned to 
near-normal levels in 2009 as Table 2 indicates: 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total Crimes 75400 72225 63028 63476 72255  
Table 2.   Total Kenyan Crimes per Year, 2005–200985 
However, if these crimes are separated by type, one can see a pattern: 
Specified Crime 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Murder 1260 1286 1261 1394 1404
Manslaughter 38 33 47 29 47
Rape 1365 1291 876 735 847
Assault 12715 13186 12089 11479 14189
Robbery 6936 5234 3492 3401 2938
Breaking 8454 7420 6337 6626 7053
Theft of Stock 2219 2209 1568 2269 2876
Stealing* 10509 7938 8387 9235 10100
Theft of Motor Vehicle 654 695 557 606 594
Theft of Vehicle Parts 434 355 284 308 315
Theft from Motor Vehicle 281 313 217 219 221
Theft by Servant 2874 2700 2169 2387 2732
Dangerous Drugs 6356 5821 5401 4407 5541
Handling Stolen Property 389 619 345 423 367
Corruption 107 252 177 133 158
Causing Death by Driving  211 189 199 209 301
All Other Offences 20598 22684 19622 19616 22572
Total Crimes** 75400 72225 63028 63476 72255  
Table 3.   Specific Crime Totals in Kenya, 2005–200986 
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In specific crimes, there was a considerable drop in robbery.  Furthermore, if one 
examines the data before 2005, it can be seen that total robberies since the introduction of 
M-PESA in 2007 suddenly dropped to the lowest total since Kenya began recording 
crime statistics in 1995, then continued to drop in subsequent years.  In 1995, there were 
5,686 robberies reported.87  Robberies continued a general climb to peak in 2001 at 
9,180.  After 2001, they began to decrease until 2006 when they were at 5,234, or about 8 
percent lower than in 1995.  It is likely this increase and then decrease over twelve years 
may have been due to traditional, cyclical factors that influence crime, such as the state of 
the economy and the level of police enforcement.  However, after 2006 robberies 
experienced the steepest decline in recorded data of 33 percent by the end of 2007, and 
continued this decline another 15 percent by 2009: 88, 89 
 
Table 4.   Kenya Total Robberies, 1995–200990 
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There is also one key difference with M-Pesa as it relates to crime statistics, in 
that these crime totals cover the entire country of Kenya while M-Pesa can only be used 
where there is cell phone coverage.  Cell phone coverage in Kenya between 2007 and 
2009 only existed in very specific and well-defined areas.  If one examines these areas in 
contrast to others, one can see a difference between crimes outside of the M-Pesa 
coverage area and those within. 
2. Regional Crime in Mobile Areas Vs. No-Coverage Areas 
Kenyan crime statistics are divided among ten regions, which constitute the eight 
provinces of Kenya, as well as two special areas known as “Railways” and “Kapu.”  
Geographically, the provinces of Kenya look like this: 
 
 
Figure 6.   Provinces of Kenya 
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 Safaricom’s services are mostly specific to some of these provinces, as can be 
seen in the map below: 
 
Figure 7.   Safaricom Coverage Map, 200991 
To better understand this map as it relates to each province, it is helpful to know 
the number of cell phone towers in each province per capita.  This is a good gauge of 
coverage for Kenya’s population per province: 
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Table 5.   Kenyan Safaricom Cell Towers, per Province and Population92 
From the Table 5 , it is evident that the provinces of Nairobi, Coast and Central 
have the most cell phone coverage per population.  This may now be contrasted with 
crime totals for each province: 
Province 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Nairobi 12300 11302 6395 4667 4712
Rift Valley 15320 14730 12590 9945 19716
Central 12237 10900 10187 12130 9929
Eastern 9454 9812 9615 9704 10003
Nyanza 7913 7962 7756 8739 8721
Coast 8629 8601 8182 9639 9291
Western 8546 7600 7088 7402 8610
North Eastern 605 949 786 849 1020  
Table 6.   Kenyan Crime Totals, per Province, per Year93 
At first, it appears total crime data specific to the provinces most covered by 
Safaricom also fails to show a strong relationship between M-Pesa and total crimes 
reported.  While M-Pesa usage grew from 2007 to 2008, crime also increased in two of 
the three provinces with the greatest cell phone coverage (Coast and Central).  However, 
it should be noted that by the end of 2008, there were only a few million users of M-Pesa, 
and many of these were in the capital of Nairobi where it was first rolled out and 
advertised.  Despite the wide coverage in the Central and Coast provinces, users in these 
                                                 
92. Jack and Suri, “The Economics of M-PESA,” 7. 
93. Text from Kenyan Police Crime Statistics, 2007 and 2008 reports. 
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areas may have been less familiar with M-Pesa as it took hold within Safaricom.  In that 
context Nairobi, where adoption of M-Pesa has been most prolific and where Safaricom 
touches the most cell phone users per capita, enjoyed a drop in crime that was quite 
dramatic.  Crime plummeted almost 43 percent by the end of 2007 from previous years.  
By the end of 2008, it was down 59 percent from two years earlier before the introduction 
of M-Pesa.  This historic low was more or less maintained in 2009, still being 58 percent 
lower than 2007. 
Also, as M-Pesa continued to grow from 2008 to 2009, the next two most covered 
cell phone provinces saw similar trends.  Number two Coast province saw a drop in crime 
of 3.6 percent between 2008 and 2009, while number three Central province saw a drop 
in crime of 18 percent.   
 
Figure 8.   Kenya Crime Trends, per Province, 2005–2009 
Further research is needed in subsequent years to see if these trends continue.  It 
would be useful to know statistics for each type of crime within each province per month 
through 2010, as well as how this compares with specific growth of M-Pesa usage 
statistics within each province.  More research should be done to confirm M-Pesa’s 
impact on crime, but so far the data is promising, especially in robbery.  It can be 
theorized that Kenyan citizens can transfer their physical money into mobile money and 
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circumvent robbers as they travel throughout the country, providing a negative incentive 
for criminals to rob.  Since strong states provide security and have lower crime rates, 
mobile money appears to boost state strength and security—an important goal of nation-
building. 
C. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS BEYOND CRIME:  CORRUPTION 
There is also some evidence to suggest that the use of M-Pesa may have a positive 
impact on corruption.  Due to the success in Kenya, Vodacom and the DFID again 
partnered together to bring M-Pesa to Afghanistan.94  Using the local cell phone 
company Roshan and calling the service “M-Piasa,” they started the service in 2008.95  
Today, it is available in most major cities in Afghanistan.96   
What is perhaps most interesting is a story that took place when the service was 
first rolled out.  The pilot program of M-Paisa used 50 Afghan National Police, who 
could withdraw their money directly from Roshan or transfer it to anyone else using M-
Paisa.97  Chris Bold, writing for the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), 
states: 
The trial was a success, despite having to overcome some initial 
challenges such as a police commander who wanted the service shut 
down, as he was no longer receiving his usual cut of the salaries. The 
police officers were initially surprised at how large the payments were 
when they received their full salary, which was a third higher than what 
they were used to receiving.98  
In just one province, among 50 of the first police to use the service, the 
transparency that mobile money brought revealed that all of the police were having a 
third of their salary stolen by their commander.  It therefore comes as little surprise when 
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we hear of the lawlessness and corruption of Afghan police, who must make their money 
through other means when a legitimate salary is beyond their reach.   
E-money has also exposed outright theft by more officials in Afghanistan where 
widespread corruption is a serious problem.  A few years ago, nearly 94 percent of 
Afghan police training records reported problems with paying police, despite the U.S. 
government paying the force on time.99  Upon further examination, it was discovered that 
superior officers were “skimming” from the pay of those under them, so that many police 
were going months without pay while those above them grew rich.  Subsequently, the 
United States implemented Electronic Fund Transfers (EFTs) instead of cash 
transactions, enabling officers to receive their pay directly through the bank of their 
choice without interference from their chain of command.  Today, all Afghan provinces 
are using EFTs, and 57 percent of the police force is receiving this money, a significant 
improvement from a few years earlier.100  This number should continue to increase in 
subsequent years as EFTs becomes more understood and widely used in Afghanistan. 
This problem is not exclusive to the lowest levels of Afghanistan, which has 
frequently struggled to pay its police due to corrupt officials skimming the physical 
currency of troops before they are paid.  This problem exists at the highest levels of the 
Afghan government as well, with millions of dollars in bags of physical cash going 
directly to the President of Afghanistan himself.101  President Karzai assures everyone 
this money goes to his people, but where is the audit trail to prove it?  It is difficult to 
achieve the level of transparency and accountability when using bags of physical cash. 
It is not enough to pay security well, but security must be paid effectively also, 
ensuring the salaries given them are the payments they receive.  Mobile money can help 
to achieve this by bringing transparency to the payment process, reducing corruption in 
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the system, and increasing the rationality of the security system.  This may have wide-
ranging implications for security in states, such as Pakistan, with high corruption indices 
that also possess WMD while struggling with transnational terrorism.   
As crime and corruption are reduced with e-money, it is likely to have a positive 
impact on the weaker state with high crime and corruption.  E-money may then help the 
state transition to being a stronger state by lowering crime and corruption.  In theory, this 
would also make states less vulnerable to harboring transnational terrorists.  E-money, as 
a soft power technique, would therefore be an effective cyberspace tool to be used in 
addition to more traditional military security to raise state capacity and lower the threat of 
transnational terrorism to the United States and its allies. 
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III. CORRUPTION AS SECURITY RISK 
 This paper will now establish corruption’s relationship to nation-building, state 
weakness, and transnational terrorism, as well as to the threat of transnational terrorists to 
acquire WMD.  Before one can discuss fighting corruption in cyberspace, one must 
understand the mechanisms of corruption thoroughly by examining cases which describe 
how corruption has been produced and maintained.  To do this, it is helpful to more 
closely examine weak states with high corruption and links to crime and terrorism, such 
as South Africa and Pakistan, as well as other weak states like Nigeria. 
A. SOUTH AFRICA 
 South Africa’s electrical infrastructure relies almost 90 percent on coal, which is 
relatively cheap in South Africa due to its abundant supply.102, 103  Nuclear power only 
provides between five and seven percent of the electrical power needed in South 
Africa.104,105  Of that nuclear power, all of it comes from a single plant in the south at 
Koeberg which uses Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) as fuel.106,107  South Africa also has 
a second nuclear reactor near Pretoria called Pelindaba or SAFARI-1, but this does not 
produce electrical power directly; it uses Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to produce 
fuel for the Koeberg plant as well as some additional research.108  If looking at the total 
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energy requirements of the entire country (such as automobiles, industry, and the like), 
nuclear power shrinks further in importance, only fulfilling 2.2 percent of South Africa’s 
complete energy requirements.109 
The chief decision makers in South Africa’s power infrastructure are the South 
African government and South Africa’s state power company, Eskom.  Control is mostly 
a public enterprise between the government and Eskom, which is a state-owned, heavily 
regulated company.  Private and military involvement is minimal.  South Africa only has 
63,000 personnel in its military.110  The state employs contract security guards through a 
company called the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (NECSA) to keep watch 
over the most critical areas.111  The most protection offered in the entire system is for the 
Pelindaba facility, which houses the HEU.  This facility is protected by closed-circuit 
television cameras inside a secure control room surrounded by three layers of triple 
fencing (including a 10,000 volt electrical fence) and “other security measures.”112  
However, the guards are still private security guards, not military men and women. 
Beyond the usual consumers and industry that rely on electrical power, 
stakeholders also include infrastructure systems that rely on a steady flow of electricity, 
such as transportation, banking, and hospitals.  The stakeholders are not limited to South 
Africa, though; in fact, it is staggering how many stakeholders there are when it comes to 
South Africa’s power supply.  Eskom also supplies 45 percent of the power to the entire 
continent of Africa, most of it in the southern region.113  Therefore, what affects South 
African power, and the decisions South Africa and Eskom make toward that power, have 
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an impact on much of the entire continent of Africa.  Conversely, energy demands in 
other African states influence South Africa’s decisions.  It is likely that energy demands 
will continue to grow. 
 In 2007, “technically sophisticated criminals” attacking in two separate waves 
breached all security at the Pelindaba nuclear facility in South Africa and had complete 
control of the facility for 45 minutes.114  They escaped unscathed and were never found.  
Given that Pelindaba at the time contained hundreds of kilograms of weapons-grade 
HEU, these criminals could have obtained the fissile material needed to build over a 
dozen nuclear bombs (HEU can be detonated in a nuclear explosion with conventional 
bombs, unlike plutonium; therefore, once you have the fissile material, the rest is 
relatively easy).115 116  Amazingly, this attack occurred two years after a previous attack, 
so that by 2007 the security in the Pelindaba facility was already elevated higher than 
when the previous attack had occurred.  Fortunately, no HEU was stolen before a 
wounded security guard triggered the alarm and the criminals were forced to flee.117  
However, one must ask how this attack could take place after a previous attack and with 
heightened security.   
The most likely scenario is that of corrupt guards, an idea first proposed by the 
same guard who called police.  The guard reported that security reinforcements were only 
three minutes away, yet they did not respond for 45 minutes.  It is entirely possible that 
bribed guards were instrumental in almost allowing the theft of enough HEU to build a 
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secure, especially since the second attack progressed even further than the first, and the 
consequences of the second attack have yielded no arrests and only the firing of three 
security guards (with no criminal probe).119   
Corruption in South Africa is not uncommon.  TI reports that South Africa’s 
Corruption Perception index (CPI) has been steadily progressing in the wrong direction 
for the past decade.  In 2001, South Africa was the 38th least corrupt nation in the CPI.120  
By 2005, it had dropped to 46th.121  Last year, it had dropped further to 55th.122  Given 
these figures and the history outlined above, it is highly likely that these nuclear plants 
are becoming less secure, not more, as corruption grows. 
 Currently, South Africa has a population over 49 million people and a GDP per 
capita of $10,600.123 124  Although many consider it the most developed country on the 
continent of Africa, it actually ranks seventh in GDP per capita on the list of African 
countries.  For comparison, Equatorial Guinea’s GDP per capita is $44,100 and 
Botswana’s is $14,700.125  However, if one looks more in depth beyond mere GDP into 
the quality of life and life expectancy, South Africa ranks far lower.  The HDI in 2009 
ranked South Africa 128th in the world, behind other African countries like Botswana, 
Egypt and Tunisia.126   
 South Africa used to rank much higher, but has been steadily trending down in 
these statistics for over ten years.  In 2005 South Africa was 120th on the HDI list, while 
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in 2000 South Africa was 103rd.127 128  Over the past ten years, South Africa has dropped 
below 25 countries in human development.  Its HDI raw number has also dropped as well 
almost every year since 1990.129  Possible reasons South Africa is dropping in these 
indices is its status as a transitional weak state, as indicated by its retarded development, 
high crime, and growing corruption.  Its infrastructure has been deteriorating, especially 
its electrical infrastructure which has been in steady decline for years.  The CIA states: 
At the end of 2007, South Africa began to experience an electricity crisis. 
State power supplier Eskom encountered problems with aged plants, 
necessitating "load-shedding" cuts to residents and businesses in the major 
cities… Unemployment remains high and outdated infrastructure has 
constrained [GDP] growth.130  
 In 2008, power disruptions became so frequent that it threatened South Africa’s 
hosting of the World Cup, forcing the government to declare a “national emergency.”131  
Service delivery and capacity may continue to deteriorate further, since South Africa’s 
rich coal reserves are predicted to shrink in the next 20 to 50 years, requiring an 
alternative form of energy.132 The South African government and Eskom now plan to 
reduce coal burning from 87 percent to fewer than 70 percent of the total source of power 
by 2025.  To do this, they plan to boost nuclear power production, until it is projected to 
produce 25 percent of the power needed—a five-fold increase from the nuclear power 
they currently produce.133   
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As stated previously, South Africa’s CPI has also grown worse the past ten years, 
in direct correlation with their worsening HDI.  At this point, it is unknown if corruption 
could be causing this decline in South African development, or if corruption is the result, 
or a combination of both.  What may be said, however, is that there appears to be a strong 
correlation between the two, since both have been declining together for a decade. 
What is interesting to note at this point, however, is that this trend follows the 
opposite of South Africa’s GDP per capita, which has actually been growing 
considerably the past ten years, despite its worsening HDI and CPI.  From 2000 to 2010, 
South Africa’s GDP per capita grew from roughly $6,300 to $10,100—a growth of over 
60 percent.134  This seems to be a paradox:  How can South Africa grow richer over a 
decade while its quality of life goes down and its corruption increases?  It seems to defy 
conventional wisdom that corruption, which acts as a tax on transactions with no public 
goods supported by that tax, would coincide with an increase in wealth, since according 
to TI the countries with the least corruption are also the richest and most economically 
developed, like Norway, Australia and the United States.135  
The answer is likely found in the fact that GDP per capita is only an average per 
person.  In simple terms, this means if the wealthy minority grows wealthier, while the 
majority who are not wealthy stay the same, then the GDP per capita will increase despite 
the fact that the majority will have noticed no increase to their standard of living.  This 
can become even more pronounced if the richest class grows wealthier in total and at a 
faster rate while the middle class actually grows poorer.  In fact, the poorer and middle 
classes may feel more disgruntled, seeing decreasing opportunity to improve their 
economic standing when compared to those who already have wealth. 
There is a measurement that exists to examine this data, invented by an Italian 
statistician named Corado Gini, representing the degree of inequality in a society’s 
economic distribution.  This statistic, called the Gini coefficient, is measured on a scale 
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of zero (being minimum inequality) to one (being maximum inequality).136  The UN 
maintains a list of the Gini coefficients of all states as part of its HDI under the 
Development Program.  If a nation has a high Gini coefficient, it actually pulls down its 
HDI.  The Gini coefficient in states where only a few control all of the wealth is 
extremely high, close to one.  Many of these are weak states.  On the opposite end of the 
scale, in the developed world where large middle classes are the norm, states have lower 
Gini coefficients.  When looking at the latest Gini coefficients published by the UN’s 
Development Program, one sees countries like Germany and the Scandinavian countries 
ranking in the top 10, with the lowest Gini coefficients under 0.29, and therefore the most 
economic opportunity and equity in society.  Conversely, countries like Haiti and 
Colombia with high crime and corruption indices, and thus weak states, rank the worst 
with the least economic opportunity and equality and Gini coefficients above 0.58.137  
Interestingly, South Africa ranks just above Colombia and Bolivia in 2007 at 134th, with 
a high Gini coefficient of 0.578.  
Despite the strong GDP per capita growth South Africa has experienced, its Gini 
coefficient has deteriorated over time, decreasing opportunities to the middle class.  
Bhorat and Kanbur state that South Africa’s Gini coefficient rose steadily (meaning 
growing more unequal) from a national Gini coefficient of 0.68 in 1975 to 0.73 in 
2001.138  Bhorat and Kanbur also break this figure down into the major ethnicities in 
South Africa and show an increasing Gini coefficient for all, to include blacks as well as 
whites.139  Although calculating the Gini with slightly different methods, and therefore 
getting slightly different results, the CIA supports the claim that South Africa’s inequality 
has been rising.  The CIA stated that South Africa’s Gini coefficient has risen from 0.593 
in 1994 to 0.65 in 2005, a troubling increase.  Finally, it should be noted that Bhorat has 
continued to publish information on South Africa’s Gini coefficient, stating last year that 
                                                 
136. Bernard Cloutier, “Gini Coefficients,” at: http://www.berclo.net/page01/01en-gini-coef.html 
(accessed October 11, 2010). 
137. Text from the UN Development Program website, “Human Development Reports,” at: 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/161.html (accessed October 11, 2010). 
138. Haroon Bhorat and S.M. Ravi Kanbur, Poverty and Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa, (Cape 
Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2006), 101. 
139. Ibid. 
 44
the Gini had risen further to 0.679, which would place South Africa near the bottom of 
the list of countries in the UN’s HDI Development Program.140 
The statistical trends seem to indicate that Gini coefficients are high among weak 
states, with some relationship to corruption.  Weak states with higher Gini coefficients 
seem to also produce lower rankings on the CPI and HDI.  As corruption and the Gini 
coefficient increase, while the HDI decreases, states tend to grow weaker, making them 
more vulnerable to terrorism.  If one of these indicators could be positively influenced, 
such as reducing crime or improving the Gini coefficient, then this could have a positive 
effect on the weak state and produce a reduction in its capacity to harbor transnational 
terrorism.  Reducing corruption or increasing the Gini coefficient would likely reduce 
grievances by citizens who see less economic opportunity, improving the state’s 
vulnerability to anti-state activities like crime and transnational terrorism.  This may be 
done in cyberspace. 
B. PAKISTAN 
 Another example of corruption and its potential implications toward the spread of 
WMD is Pakistan.  TI ranks Pakistan among the top 50 most corrupt countries in the 
world, and the situation is deteriorating.  Pakistan’s corruption index has increased over 
400 percent in the past three years, Making it as of 2010 the 35th most corrupt nation on 
the planet according to the CPI.141 142  Even worse, in 2010 Pakistan’s police were rated 
the most corrupt of all government services, making them the most corrupt of the 
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corrupt.143  Pakistan was also mentioned in a Harvard report as being under threat of 
losing nuclear material due to corruption.  The report states: 
Insiders among the elite group guarding then-Pakistani President Pervez 
Musharraf cooperated with al Qaeda in two assassination attempts that 
came within a hair’s breadth of succeeding.  If the military personnel 
guarding the President cannot be trusted, how much confidence can the 
world have in the military personnel guarding the nuclear weapons?144   
This should come as no surprise to anyone who has studied the history of 
Pakistan’s nuclear program, for its relationship to corruption is incestuous, being born 
through what has been called “one of history’s worst nuclear scandals” under the 
supervision of A.Q. Khan, the “father of Pakistan’s nuclear program.”145, 146  There is 
enormous evidence to suggest Dr. Khan has been corrupt since the 1970s, by first stealing 
nuclear designs and information from the Netherlands, then transforming it into a deadly 
weapon, and finally selling it all to the highest bidder.  He and his company, Khan 
Research Laboratories (KRL), became clandestine proliferators of nuclear technology 
and weapons-grade uranium for almost three decades.   
 Dr. Khan first began helping Pakistan build its nuclear weapons capability while 
employed in the Netherlands.  When The Netherlands began to suspect him of stealing 
their information and technology, Dr. Khan fled back to Pakistan, bringing with him The 
Netherlands’ centrifuge designs that could be used to make weapons-grade uranium.147  
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The Netherlands discovered this and tried him in absentia, where he was convicted in 
1983 of nuclear espionage and sentenced to four years in prison.148 
 Lest one confuse Dr. Khan’s motivations with that of a patriot to his native 
Pakistan, Dr. Khan did not keep his secrets in his own country.  Instead, he sold his 
nuclear knowledge and materials for his own financial gain, making many millions of 
dollars in transactions to rogue regimes and affiliates.149  When Libya decided to 
terminate its nuclear weapons program and open itself up for inspection in 2003, it 
became evident that A.Q. Khan and KRL were behind much of Libya’s technology.150  
Then, again in 2003, a team of international scientists discovered that HEU came from 
equipment Iran acquired from Pakistan.151  It is reported that Khan also sold his 
technology to North Korea and possibly China, and even met with representatives of Iraq 
and al Qaida.152 153 154  He supposedly did much of this without Pakistan’s knowledge or 
consent, as he publicly confessed in 2004 and was placed under house arrest soon 
after.155 
Pakistan’s GDP per capita has grown modestly over the past decade, increasing 
from about $1,700 in 2000 to $2,550 in 2010.156  Pakistan is still a relatively poor 
country, ranking 134th on poverty according to the CIA World Factbook—63 countries 
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lower than South Africa.157  Its HDI has improved steadily since 1980, but still ranks 
141st out of 182 countries; in 1998, Pakistan ranked 135 out of 174 countries, while in 
2005 it ranked 135 again out of 177.158 159 160  This trend seems to indicate that Pakistan 
has remained low in the HDI over the past decade when compared to other countries in 
the world, from the bottom 22.4 percent in 1998, to the bottom 23.7 percent in 2005, to 
the bottom 22.5 percent in 2009, painting a rather stagnant HDI picture.   
Despite a modest increase in GDP per capita and stagnant HDI relative to other 
countries, Pakistan’s CPI score has decreased over the past ten years.  In 2000 it was 2.3, 
ranking it 79 out of 91 states.161  It decreased further by 2005 to a 2.1, ranking 144 out of 
158.162  By 2009, it had gotten better, raising its rank to a 2.4, placing Pakistan at 139 of 
180 countries.163  However, this is still far below the developed world and among the top 
50 most corrupt countries on Earth.  Given the above statistics, Pakistan appears rather 
stagnant, with only a minor increase in GDP per capita and HDI and a minor decrease in 
corruption.  It still remains a desperately poor country, with a major corruption problem.   
When examining Pakistan’s Gini coefficient, it is very hard to get a consistent 
measurement.  Some report as many as five different Gini coefficients depending on 
different gathering techniques.164  What may be seen, though, is that Pakistan’s Gini 
coefficient seems to be steadily increasing since 2000, which could have a negative 
influence on its corruption.  In 2000, one measurement of Pakistan’s Gini coefficient was 
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only about 0.265, but the same measurement showed the Gini coefficient rising every 
year thereafter to 2005, where it had nearly doubled to 0.40.165  Unfortunately, there 
appears to have been little research on Pakistan’s Gini coefficient since that time.  This 
could be due to Pakistan’s natural disasters, such as the massive 2005 earthquake and 
2010 flooding, as well as government instability.  However, Pakistan is also key in our 
study, due to the ongoing fight against al Qaeda along the western regions of Pakistan, as 
well as Pakistan’s status as a nuclear power.  Citizens may feel today that they have less 
economic opportunity in Pakistan due to the relatively high and rising Gini coefficient, 
which could fuel insurgency and transnational terrorism.  If cyberspace governance can 
improve Pakistan’s Gini coefficient, it may strengthen Pakistan as a state and reduce the 
risk of transnational terrorism. 
C. NIGERIA 
To more adequately find the causal mechanisms of corruption, as well as its 
consequences, more data must be examined from other countries not limited to those with 
nuclear materials.  Perhaps one of the most troubling case studies for corruption is the 
country of Nigeria.  Between 1970 and 2000, the number of those in Nigeria who live on 
less than a dollar a month grew from 36 percent to 70 percent of the country’s 
population.166  With such a trend, most Nigerians have lost economically and many feel 
they will lose more in the future.  Almost half of Nigeria’s entire GDP is based on its oil 
industry, while 85 percent of this revenue goes to just one percent of the population.167  
The oil industry is centralized under the president, and local land titles and oil revenues 
flow from the central government, translating into the central government controlling 87 
percent of the resources and local states controlling the other 13 percent.168  This means 
the top one percent of the people control 42.5 percent of the GDP of the entire country, 
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contributing to a Niger Delta Gini coefficient of 0.63.169  For comparison, in the U.S. the 
top 20 percent control 49 percent of the nation’s GDP, yielding a much more equitable 
Gini coefficient of .46.170 171  Given such a horrific disparity in Nigeria, it is not 
surprising that the number of those in poverty continues to grow and feelings of 
resentment, oppression and myopothy among those of the Niger Delta run high.   
 Local Niger Delta residents control virtually nothing as it relates to oil and 
energy, since they cannot prospect for themselves or invest in oil property.  A 
centralization of money and power leads to, and indeed encourages, a Nigerian 
kleptocracy.  Some experts have estimated roughly $130 billion has left the country 
between 1970 and 1996.  A few years later in 2003, Nigerian anti-corruption official 
Ribadu estimated that 70 percent of Nigeria’s oil wealth was stolen or wasted.172  This 
flight of capital, and the effort to continue it through maintaining the flow of oil, has had 
the horrific double effect of preventing the government from having enough money to 
provide the positive rights of political goods and services while also facilitating the 
recession of negative rights through government coercion and neglect, thus preventing 
Nigeria from emerging as a liberal democracy.   
To make matters worse, this deepening corruption combined with economic 
poverty diminishes the political legitimacy of the government and has fostered an 
insurgency.  Ledum Mittee, the leader of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP), aptly stated:  “The challenge for this government is to say we want to 
now recover legitimacy.”173  Corruption and disparity are major grievances of the 
insurgents.  This loss of government legitimacy may be reversed if corruption could be 
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reduced, thus improving citizens’ perceptions of government.  As citizens see more 
economic opportunity and prosperity, they will likely leave more risky options like crime 
and transnational terrorism.  This could strengthen the state of Nigeria. 
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IV. CYBERSPACE AS SOFT POWER TOOL AGAINST 
CORRUPTION:  MOBILE SURVEILLANCE 
With the above examples, one may see that corruption has far more dire 
consequences than government inefficiency or stunted economic development.  It can and 
has had a direct impact on U.S. national security, as corruption has led to the potential or 
actual spread of nuclear weapons technology to terrorist regimes and rogue states like 
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.  One must ask, then, if the U.S. should make its priority 
enemy states that pursue nuclear programs and nuclear weapons, like Iran or North 
Korea.  Or, is one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security really with corrupt 
regimes and societies where nuclear materials exist? 
To answer this question, it should be noted that South Africa and Pakistan are 
only two examples of a global phenomenon.  The Nuclear Threat Initiative reports that, 
by 2003 there were at least 50 tons of HEU in civilian power and research facilities 
across over 50 countries, many of them among the lowest of CPI countries.174  One such 
country, Kazakhstan, has a poor corruption index rating of 105th out of 178 nations in the 
CPI, and maintains thousands of kilograms in HEU across two reactors.175 176  Even if 
South Africa and Pakistan fix their problems, an intelligent adversary could simply go 
elsewhere, to Kazakhstan for instance, to find the least-secured HEU facility in the world. 
What is the risk that this could happen?  Risk is very subjective, since different 
people place different value on the same threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences.  What 
can be safely said is that a terrorist does not use probability or random chance in deciding 
where and how to attack; in the face of an intelligent adversary, one cannot use 
probability.  Instead, one must assume the adversary will attack where it would do the 
most harm and the window of opportunity presents itself.  Using game theory, one can 
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assume any future terrorist attacks geared toward acquisition of HEU will occur at 
facilities like South Africa or Pakistan—places where weapons-grade uranium exists and, 
history has shown, guards and scientists can be bribed to look the other way or enticed to 
sell materials themselves.   
The threat is also growing as South Africa and Pakistan are following a global 
trend.  Currently, nuclear power produces 16 percent of the world’s electricity.  The 
International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) predicts that this will grow 13 percent 
by 2020, mostly due to the environmental friendliness of nuclear power plants which do 
not produce as much greenhouse gas as the volatile fossil fuel market.177  China and 
India also plan to pursue nuclear power, with plans to increase nuclear power up to six 
and ten times, respectively.178  Furthermore, DHS Secretary Napolitano announced the 
U.S. would not be able to screen all cargo for WMD material by 2012.179  If terrorists or 
dissidents were able to obtain HEU, they could transport it into the U.S. through 
legitimate ports of entry.  Also, considering it only takes 25 kg of HEU to produce a 
nuclear bomb, it would be relatively easy to smuggle this across our vast borders 
undetected.  Terrorists could fit this amount inside just six empty milk containers.180  
Even worse, HEU is surprisingly only slightly radioactive and can be handled by hand, 
making it extremely easy to transport.181 
Fortunately, the world is at least addressing this concern at the highest levels.  In 
2009 the U.N. passed Security Resolution 1887, which calls on all nations to reduce HEU 
as much as possible.  President Obama held a Nuclear Summit in April 2010 to 
encourage nations to exert more control over their nuclear fuel and eliminate weapons-
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grade fuel like HEU.182  Many countries, like Chile, Serbia, the Czech Republic, and 
Ukraine, are repatriating their HEU stockpiles to Russia and the U.S.183  South Africa is 
also attempting to do better.  It has contracted with Russia to supply it with 45 percent of 
its LEU needs, reducing its dependence on the Pelindaba facility.184  It has also begun 
converting the Pelindaba facility to use only LEU, eliminating the stockpile of HEU 
completely.185  So, even if the facility is compromised again, any stolen uranium should 
not be viable for a nuclear weapon.  All of these endeavors are being tracked and 
monitored internationally by the IAEA as well as locally by the National Nuclear Energy 
Association (NNEA) in Washington, D.C.186   
However, these mitigations only consolidate the threat to countries with HEU 
stockpiles; they do not address the threat of corruption.  In fact, they may make things 
worse.  First, there is a danger that U.S. efforts will continue to be focused on state-based 
actors, as with Iran and North Korea, which may be dissuaded with more traditional 
military diplomacy (massive nuclear retaliation).  Instead, U.S. efforts may be better 
served focusing on fighting corruption within states that maintain stockpiles of nuclear 
material.  While Iran has been mentioned almost daily in news outlets for its pursuit of 
nuclear power (which is operated by Russia and only uses LEU fuel provided by Russia), 
few are talking about risk-prone states like Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Russia 
itself.187 
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The second danger of not addressing the real threat of corruption is that the 
current strategy for mitigating risk involves, as stated previously, consolidating HEU into 
a few countries with large nuclear stockpiles, such as the U.S. and Russia.  If one 
examines Russia under the lens of corruption, one will see a picture even worse than 
Pakistan.  The same Harvard study which suggested an immense threat within Pakistan of 
nuclear theft due to corruption also named Russia.  Russia ranks even lower than Pakistan 
among the bottom 50 most corrupt countries at 154 of 178, or the 24th most-corrupt 
nation on Earth.188 189 Moreover, Russia’s nuclear guards are conscripts who are poorly 
paid and trained, and are therefore prime targets for bribery.190  Is the world really safer 
by having Russia guard so much weapons-grade nuclear material? 
Finally, there is a third danger in not addressing the problems of corruption, in 
that solutions can have a broader impact beyond WMD to foster COIN and nation-
building.  It is estimated that $1 billion in foreign aid to Afghanistan, meant for stability 
operations, actually goes to the Taliban.191  As little as 10 percent actually goes to the 
citizens of Afghanistan who desperately need the money due to corrupt officials.192  
Therefore, corruption plays a role, both in fostering transnational terrorists, the 
proliferation of WMD, and the decrease of stability in strategic countries.   
The current focus on state governments alone is reminiscent of the Cold War 
when the U.S. worried about what the U.S.S.R. would do with its nuclear weapons.  
However, this is no longer the world we live in.  With the globalization revolution and 
the birth of the Internet, the major threat now lies with networked individuals across the 
global market of transnational terrorism.  This is the face of the enemy who already 
struck New York and the Pentagon nine years ago, killing almost 3,000 people.  If a 
similar enemy can succeed through a corrupt, failing state by stealing just a few dozen 
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kilograms of material, they would be incredibly close to executing a nuclear sequel to 
9/11.  Only with HEU, they could destroy all of New York City and kill millions, not just 
disintegrate a few blocks and murder and wound thousands. 
Instead of focusing the vast majority of its efforts on states, which would likely 
not attack us for fear of nuclear retaliation, the U.S. should double its efforts toward 
fostering capacity against corruption in all nations that possess HEU stockpiles or are 
vulnerable to failure.  To do this, we must first understand the theory behind corruption 
and how it may be combated in these states.  From here, we can attack the problem 
within states who maintain WMD using the principles of the global information 
revolution to our advantage, especially in states with secure storage of nuclear knowledge 
and material. 
A. GLOBAL DATA 
There exists a general consensus among scholars that corruption is strongly linked 
to the Gini coefficient.  Li, Xu and Zou found that “corruption alone also explains a large 
proportion of the Gini differential across developing and industrial countries.”193  Dincer 
and Gunalp found a strong correlation to corruption whenever a high Gini coefficient was 
present.194  Khagram and You collected data which suggests a two-way causality 
between a country’s Gini coefficient and corruption.195  This increases the risk of 
transnational terrorism. 
Although there is no universal agreed-upon law or equation which completely 
defines all the causes of corruption, it does seem that poverty and a lack of economic 
opportunity, as seen by a high Gini coefficient, have a compounding impact on 
corruption.  Therefore, if there were a way to increase the GDP per capita for lower and 
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middle-income citizens directly, this should have a positive impact on the nation’s Gini 
coefficient, and therefore also yield a positive impact on corruption based on Khagram 
and You’s two-way causality.   
Here, it should be noted that this is usually the exact opposite of traditional 
strategy, where wealthy nations pour in large amounts of foreign aid to developing 
countries through a “top-down” bureaucratic approach.  Foreign aid, as it flows through 
the developing nation’s government often does not improve the Gini coefficient.  Instead, 
funds are usually siphoned off by corrupt officials in power, leading to further disruptions 
in the Gini coefficient with less opportunity for those whom the aid was intended and 
continuing instability.  In 2002, the African Union stated that corruption was costing 
Africa $150 billion in development and aid.196  A scathing 2009 report by Dambisa 
Moyo, a former economist at Goldman Sachs, stated “money from rich countries has 
trapped many African nations in a cycle of corruption, slower economic growth and 
poverty.  Cutting off the flow would be far more beneficial.”197   
This is often true because the general population does not have access to these 
funds as they are absorbed and transferred through murky government processes and 
officials.  There is very little transparency, which is defined by TI as “a principle that 
allows those affected by administrative decisions, business transactions or charitable 
work to know not only the basic facts and figures but also the mechanisms and processes. 
It is the duty of civil servants, managers and trustees to act visibly, predictably and 
understandably.”198  However, transparency is not the only issue discussed when fighting 
corruption.  Consider that USAID titled its landmark journal on the subject of anti-
corruption “Transparency and Accountability,” stating ten years ago that “interlaced with 
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these objectives are the principles of increasing transparency and accountability.”199  The 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as well as 
the World Bank also link transparency and accountability as the primary means to 
combat corruption.200, 201  Accountability is generally defined as an obligation to accept 
or be held responsible for one's actions.  Transparency and accountability are both 
necessary in combating corruption.  If transactions aren’t transparent, citizens will not 
have concrete evidence of wrongdoing by their officials.  Consequently, if they know of 
this wrongdoing but no retributive action accompanies this knowledge, there is no 
accountability, and corruption still flourishes. 
Transparency and accountability may counter corruption through a bottom-up 
approach, which circumvents government bureaucracy, since one may generate counter-
corruption strategies which leverage these concepts to strategically attack the unequal 
economic opportunity that fosters a high Gini coefficient by directly supporting lower 
and middle class incomes.  This would theoretically undermine corruption, since far 
fewer middle-men would be involved in transactions and government bureaucracy would 
be greatly reduced.  Accountability can and should be fostered at the lowest and highest 
levels to reduce corruption as well as the development of terrorist havens and WMD 
smuggling. 
There exists further literature and debate regarding corruption theory and the 
origins of corruption, to include cultural, structural, and rational-choice explanations.  For 
instance, cultural frames explain corruption based on religious beliefs, such as 
Protestantism being tied to lower corruption rates, or based on familial ties, such as 
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Chinese and Italian extended families and organized crime networks, which traditionally 
sport higher levels of corruption and which e-governance is unlikely to influence. The 
remaining structural and rational choice factors may be different.  One well-documented 
link in the cause of corruption is political, in that a strong correlation has been found 
between liberal democracies and low corruption.202  This is linked primarily to increased 
levels of transparency found in liberal democracies that encourage public participation 
and protect freedom of the press, as well as in increased accountability, where those who 
are found to be corrupt are usually thrown out of office or prosecuted.203  It is therefore 
likely that those who live in non-democratic countries experience much more limited 
transparency and accountability in governance, giving rise to more bribery and other 
manifestations of corruption such as embezzlement, blackmail, and intimidation.  E-
governance could help counter this by increasing transparency and accountability in 
government operations through e-money and surveillance.  Both of these are expected to 
reduce corruption, which could, in turn, reduce the threat of terrorists acquiring WMD.  
Fortunately, there are a growing number of technologies that can do this in 
today’s twenty-first century Information Age, technologies that did not exist only a 
decade ago.  These technologies no longer require the cumbersome and expensive 
infrastructure of servers, personal computers, and ground cables laid in industrialized 
nations.  Today, they are already spread throughout the developing world, just waiting to 
be used in small, portable devices like the mobile money of Kenya.  As discussed, mobile 
money already shows promise in combating corruption, crime, and quite possibly 
reversing a negative Gini coefficient trend.  Mobile devices are becoming even more 
powerful as we approach the second decade of the twenty-first century. 
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B. CYBERSPACE SURVEILLANCE 
Money, by itself, does not thwart crime.  Only in money’s strategic employment, 
by offering a means of banking to the poor and an exit from physical currency, with 
effective digital security and auditing, may it become a tool to combat crime.  Cyberspace 
can help with this, as seen with mobile money.  Similarly, surveillance alone does not 
combat corruption.  Who is monitoring the information, and what is done if the 
surveillance captures corruption?  Again, the strategic employment of mechanisms for 
transparency and accountability embedded in surveillance are necessary for surveillance 
to prevail in fighting corruption. 
Army FM 3-0 defines surveillance as “the systematic observation of aerospace, 
surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, 
photographic or other means.”204  The DoD usually groups surveillance under the greater 
umbrella of ISR, where intelligence is defined as “(1) the product resulting from the 
collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available 
information concerning foreign countries or areas; (2) information and knowledge about 
an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.”205 
Reconnaissance is defined as “a mission undertaken to obtain by visual observation or 
other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or 
potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or 
geographic characteristics of a particular area.”206   
The DoD already possesses quality resources in surveillance under the umbrella 
of ISR, supported by various technologies like UAVs, satellites, and electronic 
eavesdropping.  Secretary Gates has called for more ISR specifically, linked mostly to 
UAVs.207  However, since surveillance is usually grouped with intelligence and 
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reconnaissance within ISR, which seems increasingly linked to UAVs, it is interesting to 
note what differentiates surveillance from intelligence and reconnaissance.  For 
intelligence, FM 3-0 specifies “foreign” or “adversary.”  Reconnaissance specifies 
“enemy” or physical characteristics of an area.  ISR technologies are often therefore 
designed or used to fight the strategic, traditional wars that Secretary Gates discusses, 
against physical enemies or targets of interest.  UAVs and Special Forces may use ISR 
effectively against transnational terrorists, but what about the corrupt enablers of those 
terrorists?   
Only surveillance, which has a broad definition of simple observation of people or 
places, is adaptable outside the framework of the traditional, adversary-centric role of 
military ISR.  Surveillance may therefore prove useful in operations specific to nation-
building, where specific military “hard power” targets cannot be identified.  Furthermore, 
surveillance can be magnified through cyberspace to foster transparency and 
accountability, and therefore be an effective tool in fighting corruption.   
1. Mobile Surveillance 
Returning to the breached South African Pelindaba nuclear facility of 2007, 
surveillance was used for the facility’s security.  As mentioned earlier, Pelindaba was 
protected by closed-circuit television cameras inside a secure control room.208  However, 
this surveillance was very traditional in its approach, in that it was apparently not 
connected to any other systems and was only monitored by human guards.  Corruption 
for these guards is suspect, since the one guard who did call police stated “a camera at the 
fence taped the intruders, but guards who were supposed to be watching the monitors 
didn’t report the men.”209  This is why the guard, Mr. Gruber, thought that bribed guards, 
who were supposed to be monitoring surveillance, were responsible for allowing an 
attempt to steal enough HEU to build a dozen nuclear bombs.  Despite being on site, the 
guards did not respond for 45 minutes. 
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Traditional, physical surveillance is co-located with the location that is being 
surveyed, either with real-time guards or tape that may be accessed off-site but is still 
located and collected at the location.  This pairing of observation and accountability can 
be exploited, as may be the case at Pelindaba.  Once the target was set, the criminals only 
needed to find the local guards and offer them substantial money to look the other way. 
With modern cyberspace technologies, however, physical surveillance need not 
be at the same facility, or even the same government entity, as that which holds the 
nuclear material.  This makes it much more difficult for the criminals or terrorists, since 
they must first figure out who is watching the cameras.  If those individuals are in another 
location, perhaps even across the country, they must locate and bribe them as well.  
However, unlike closed caption television, video through the Internet can be replicated 
repeatedly and streamed to multiple locations with great resiliency.  Even if terrorists 
could find the location off-site where surveillance was being monitored, they are unlikely 
to find multiple sites, thus improving transparency and accountability. 
These types of cameras are already in use, though not for nation-building or 
fighting corruption.  An interesting application is a site called Africam, which sets up 
several cameras on wildlife preserves.  Anyone with an Internet connection can simply 
pick the site he or she wants to watch, and after a brief advertisement from the sponsor, 
can watch the spot they selected in real time.210  These cameras may be monitored by 
thousands of individuals, real time.  Such technology may be effective in guarding 
sensitive targets like WMD facilities, since they lend themselves to robust transparency 
and accountability.  No single site or guard could be targeted for bribery. 
These technologies also differ vastly from traditional physical surveillance in that 
they are extremely cheap and can be wirelessly transmitted anywhere in the world.  One 
example is an Internet camera made by Linksys, which can detect motion, send live video 
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wirelessly to a smart phone anywhere in the world, but only costs $85.211, 212  Such high 
capability, combined with low cost and little infrastructure requirements, would be ideal 
for developing nations, allowing multiple cameras to “guard” a site and paths to that site.  
These solutions could also be used in a plethora of circumstances beyond sensitive areas, 
to include police checkpoints that are known to fail due to corrupt police.   
The BBC reports from Iraq that trucks, which are required to receive special 
inspections due to their use as car bombs, often go unchecked due to bribed guards.  In 
discussing a truck bomb which killed over 100 people in Bagdad, BBC reported:   
Iraq’s state television channel has broadcast what it said was a confession 
by one of the organizers of the 19 August bombings, who spoke of paying 
$10,000 to get a truck laden with explosives into the centre of the capital.  
Some doubt this confession. Investigations continue. But insurgents are 
known to have used this tactic many times before to bypass security 
checks.  And 11 security personnel have so far been arrested in connection 
with last week's attacks.213 
One way this may be combated is through cheap, mobile security cameras placed inside 
security checkpoints.  Guards would be less likely to take bribes and not inspect vehicles 
if they knew they might be monitored by other personnel at an undisclosed location. 
This may seem unrealistic, but this is already bearing fruit in Afghanistan.  While 
the United States has focused its counter-corruption efforts toward prime targets of 
Afghan leaders and foreign contractors, a non-profit NGO named Integrity Watch 
Afghanistan (IWA) has been working in 105 communities to monitor local corruption:214 
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Staff identify one reconstruction project to monitor in each community. 
Residents then choose two volunteers to visit the construction site at least 
twice a week. They are armed with cameras to take pictures and video 
interviews with foremen. In best case scenarios, they get their hands on 
copies of the contract.215 
IWA has had numerous success stories using this technique, forcing several 
reconstruction projects to alter course.216  They now have plans to expand their 
operations to government officials with reports directly to the heads of each Ministry in 
the Afghanistan government.217  This program could be greatly expanded and automated 
throughout the country for very little capital outlay or maintenance. 
2. Transformation from Physical to Cyber 
The advancements of this technology go beyond physical surveillance as 
discussed above.  These cameras could also be used for more complex, informational 
computing, such as face recognition technology or audio eavesdropping, to find 
suspected terrorists and trace their movements.  Again, this may seem like a daunting task 
for small cameras in a developing nation with little infrastructure.  However, this 
technology may prove more achievable than many think. 
The Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI) supercomputer was born in 
1999.218  Using open-source software called BOINC, it was called the fastest 
supercomputer in the world.219  It still holds this title.  For comparison, BOINC software 
processed 3.4 quadrillion calculations per second on November 1, 2010.220  This was 
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almost a quadrillion calculations per second faster than the “fastest supercomputer in the 
world,” the Chinese supercomputer Tianhe-1A, which only processes 2.5 quadrillion 
calculations per second.221   
BOINC achieved this fast calculation rate because it works differently than the 
traditional computer.  It does not have a large, physical body as does the traditional 
supercomputer.  Instead, BOINC uses volunteers with regular PCs, then outsources data 
to those computers for processing during idle time.  These PCs are then networked 
through BOINC to a central server which downloads data after it has been processed at 
each PC.  The users experience no inconvenience, while the central server gets tens of 
thousands of volunteer processors it never had before.222  Using this distributed 
computing model, sometimes also called grid computing, one can achieve even better 
results than a physical supercomputer.  Furthermore, this technology can be leveraged 
with minimal additional cost.  BOINC is free for use and can run on very simple, cheap 
computers like smart phones and gaming consoles.223   Therefore, even the smallest and 
most mobile of computers could be turned into seeing and listening devices with a central 
“brain” supercomputer analyzing the data, without the need for a large architecture or a 
physical supercomputer. 
The cyberspace application of surveillance suggests that countries guarding 
WMD or fissile materials could benefit from these or similar e-governance solutions, as 
well as countries with poor physical infrastructures where the U.S. is involved in nation-
building.  For instance, instead of a central command and control structure that is manned 
by human beings on location, a country could use a distributed data repository that is 
backed up and monitored by electronic sensors controlled remotely.  Vast arrays of 
monitors could be connected and configured to stream live data to any government 
official, to include not just security personnel, but their supervisors as well.  It could even 
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be configured to sound an alarm automatically with no human intervention required.  
Such a solution would provide redundant transparency, since streaming video could be 
replicated and accessed by many government officials and agencies, as well as citizen 
watch groups.  It would also provide greater accountability, since supervisors and citizens 
could have access to the same information as the guards they employ.  It would only be 
limited by the depth of strategic vision and the resources dedicated to integrate it into the 
host country. 
It is possible that sophisticated terrorists could attempt to circumvent these 
measures.  Terrorists may attempt to disrupt, block, or attack physical surveillance or 
distributed computing.  This risk could be mitigated somewhat with robust connections, 
automatic responses and security measures.  However, this goes beyond the scope of this 
thesis, in that this risk is more technical in nature and not specific to surveillance as 
applied against corruption. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Mobile money and mobile surveillance are only two technologies examined in 
this thesis.  The scope of all technologies that may be utilized through cyberspace to 
project soft power within the context of DoD operations, or especially within the context 
of the entire federal government, goes far beyond this work.  However, by focusing on 
just these two technologies, it has been shown that effective use of mobile money through 
cyberspace, as sponsored by either the DoD, other aspects of USG, or host nations, may 
prove effective in nation-building missions by providing greater security against robbery 
specifically and crime in general.  Furthermore, mobile money and mobile surveillance 
may also have a positive impact against corruption, which would bring greater security in 
the context of transnational terrorists and their efforts to acquire WMD.  These 
technologies, as well as many other capabilities in cyberspace, may be very effective 
toward building the hybrid capability that is so useful in soft power, and for which the 
DoD is now pursuing toward nation-building missions as well as counterterrorism.   
The United States can use these e-governance practices through cyberspace not 
only within nations where stability operations and nation-building operations exist, but 
also in weak and failing states where the United States may become embroiled in the 
future.  As mentioned earlier in this thesis, Kenya is ranked just above Sudan in the HDI.  
Southern Sudan is rich in oil resources, yet is voting for their independence from Sudan 
in January.224  This poses a large risk in violence.  Already over $60 million has been 
pledged by international donors for contingency planning.225  What will happen if there 
is a disaster, with wide-scale violence, and AFRICOM is tasked to intervene?  Perhaps 
these lessons will be valuable to Sudan, or any other future mission, where the United 
States finds itself building nations while also combating transnational terrorists.  They are 
already bearing some fruit in Afghanistan. 
                                                 
224. Associated Press, “UN Official Says Southern Sudan’s January Independence Vote Holds 
Unprecedented Risks,” The Star Tribune, November 5, 2010, at: 
http://www.startribune.com/world/106759043.html (accessed November 5, 2010). 
225. Ibid. 
 68
It is useful to consider how much cyberspace has evolved as we enter into the 
second decade of the twenty-first century.  However, we must also consider that 
cyberspace will continue to evolve, as will the people who use it.  As devices continue to 
become more portable and accessible to the developed world, how many Internet users in 
the developed world will the ITU report in 2015, or 2020?  Due to the low literacy rate in 
Afghanistan, Afghan mobile users of M-Paisa are already getting Dari and Pashtu voice 
recognition capability.226  Afghans no longer need to read menus or navigate with 
numbers.  Cyberspace is opening to them, just as it is opening to anyone and everyone, 
even those in the most rural of areas and without any formal education. 
There will likely come a day in the not so distant future when the developing 
world catches up to the developed world in sheer Internet connectivity.  By the third or 
fourth decade of the twenty-first century, people in the developing world will still likely 
lack the resources and advanced applications of the developed world.  However, by that 
time they will at least have access to many of the cyber resources and capabilities the 
developed world enjoys today.  Their mobile phones may be capable of connecting to 
Internet services the way our smart phones do today, perhaps even more so.  This 
connectivity will lend itself even further to cyberspace soft power. 
Given the U.S. military’s new focus on cyberspace and soft power, and the hybrid 
types of conflicts that come with nation-building and counterterrorism, the DoD and USG 
should consider leveraging these goals together.  Cyberspace power is unique and lends 
itself very effectively to soft power, perhaps even more so than the other domains of air, 
land, sea and space.  This thesis has attempted to demonstrate this is possible, in that 
cyberspace is no longer an exclusive technology to be leveraged only in strong nations 
with robust infrastructures.  Nations can be built through cyberspace, even in weak states 
or post-conflict scenarios where computers and electricity are problematic.   
Furthermore, pursuing this soft power through cyberspace will become more 
critical as more nations enter the world as nuclear powers and even more build nuclear 
power facilities.  With the threat of WMD growing, the United States and its allies should 
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attempt to export this cyberspace soft power to help these nations ensure terrorists do not 
obtain nuclear grade fuel.  What if Iran, which has a uranium fuel agreement with Russia, 
also agreed to stream their surveillance and security feeds into a Russian security agency?  
Although the United States may not trust Russia as much as other allies, it would provide 
some modicum of better security than trusting Iran by itself.  Other moderating nations, 
like Brazil, could also be of use in bridging the surveillance gap with Iran.  Such 
technology, implemented correctly, would be a welcome complement to the current 
singular solution of sporadic UN inspections.  Iran would no doubt be problematic and 
difficult to pursue, but it is still worthy of consideration for other nations as well. 
There exists a darker side to this technology as well.  There is a risk that terrorists 
or criminals could hack into these technologies and turn them against us by stealing 
money virtually or gaining access to sensitive surveillance images.  This risk could be 
mitigated by good information system security practices.  Regardless, the benefits are 
worthy of consideration, especially given the fact that there is already a security risk 
within weak states that are not yet using this technology. 
Regardless, more research is needed in the future, especially as mobile money and 
mobile surveillance become more prominent in the developing world.  Various indices, 
like the HDI, CPI, Gini coefficients, and crime rates, should be closely monitored in 
countries like Kenya, South Africa and Afghanistan which aggressively pursue this 
technology.  Also, institutions from the DoD, DoS, NGOs and private companies should 
be encouraged to invest in these efforts to help states at most risk of failure. 
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